Abstract: This article surveys financial markets experiments from a particular vantage point, namely, asset pricing theory. The goal is to assess to what extent these experiments have (and could) shed light on the validity of the basic principles of asset pricing theory, namely (i) that markets equilibrate to the point that expected returns are proportional to covariance with aggregate risk, (ii) that markets aggregate dispersed
Introduction
This paper surveys experiments of financial markets that were designed with the competitive paradigm in mind. The results will be analyzed from a particular theoretical angle, namely, asset pricing theory. That is, we discuss to what extent a given financial markets experiment can shed light on the validity of asset pricing theory.
Modern asset pricing theory has strong roots in economics and probability theory. Its models are logically compelling, and the derivations elegant. Many models are widely used in industry and government, in applications of capital budgeting, industry rate regulation, performance evaluation, etc. Yet, there is surprising little evidence in support of the theory, and what has come forth is controversial. But tests of asset pricing models have almost exclusively been based on econometric analysis of historical data from naturally occuring markets. That type of empirical analysis is very difficult, because many auxiliary assumptions (homogeneous, correct ex-ante beliefs, stationarity, unbiased samples, etc.) have to be added to the theory for it to become testable. Not all experiments on financial markets were designed with the idea that they should verify theoretical principles. Often, the link with the theory is vague. Sometimes, the outcomes of loosely designed experiments were ambiguous, and, because of the absence of a solid theoretical foundation, difficult to interpret. As it turns out, this will include some widely cited experiments, and, consequently, our analysis will be provocative.
But that is meant to generate renewed interest in experimentation with financial markets. Indeed, after much activity in the eighties, interest in financial markets experiments disappeared almost entirely. Only recently have experiments re-appeared, and the successes may be attributed to their solid asset pricing theoretic foundation.
Asset pricing theory studies the pricing and allocation of risk in competitive financial markets. (Although it could widen its scope to other mechanisms, the competitive market is studied almost exclusively.) At the outset is the presumption that there are risk averse agents who invest, to smooth consumption over time, and to diversify risk. The latter implies that portfolio analysis (allocation of wealth across several securities) take a core position.
Asset pricing theory also studies the ability of competitive financial markets to aggregate diverse information about uncertain future events. This led to the development of new equilibrium concepts that go beyond the neoclassical Walrasian equilibrium that is generally appealed to in the study of goods markets.
We should mention here, in particular, the perfect foresight equilibrium (PFE; see [44] ), the rational expectations equilibrium (REE), with its two variations, the fully revealing REE (FRREE; see, e.g., [30, 45, 35] ) and the partially revealing REE (PRREE; [1, 31] ).
The existence of several equilibrium concepts obviously makes aggregation analysis difficult and controversial. Perhaps because of the controversies, it was aggregation that first caught the attention of experimentors. But it is also the more difficult part of asset pricing theory. So, asset pricing theorists would be surprised to see this historical development. The interest in aggregation may be explained by experimentors' (then unproven) conviction that risk aversion cannot possibly play a role in experimental financial markets, because of the size of typical risks that subjects take on. Recent experiments demonstrate convincingly that risk aversion (or something that has the same features) clearly plays a role in financial markets.
Of the many predictions of asset pricing theory, we are going to focus on two. We already mentioned one, namely, that financial markets can aggregate (partially or fully) dispersed information. The other prediction is: financial markets equilibrate, to the point that expected excess returns are proportional to covariance with aggregate risk. The latter statement encompasses virtually all homogeneous-information asset pricing models, including the CAPM (where aggregate risk is measured by the return on the market portfolio 1 ), consumption-based models (where aggregate risk is proportional to the marginal rate of substitution of consumption over time), etc. It is this second prediction that has occupied empiricists who study historical pricing data.
To test either predictions, experiments are in a certain sense necessary. That is, it is in principle impossible to test them on historical data. For the second prediction, we cannot observe aggregate risk, and proxies may give misleading information. In the case of the CAPM, [46] showed that there will always be a proxy for which the CAPM prediction holds, whether the CAPM really determines prices or not. Likewise, 1 The market portfolio is to be understood as the net aggregate supply of risky securities in the marketplace.
to test aggregation, the empiricist faces the impossible task of collecting data on the (dispersed) information in the marketplace. In contrast, both aggregate risk and individual information can be controlled in an experimental setting.
As a matter of fact, careful control of aggregate risk and information can dramatically enhance the significance of the experimental results. In the sequel, we will discuss two experiments with a large number of subjects. The first one was meant to test the CAPM. The experiment was designed such that no subject knew what the composition of the market portfolio was. Yet, the CAPM emerged (prices were set such that expected excess returns where proportional to covariance with the return on the market portfolio). Only the experimentor could verify this. Subjects could neither deliberately invest according to the CAPM (by purchasing the market portfolio), nor set prices correspondingly. In the second experiment, each subject was given a tiny bit of information about future payoffs. Only when aggregated across subjects did this give a clear prediction. Only the experimentor could verify to what extent the dispersed information was aggregated.
We will interpret the experiments that the literature reports on, not as attempts to mimick the naturally occuring markets like the NYSE or NASDAQ, but as tests of the basic principles of asset pricing theory.
For the latter to be universal, they must work in simple laboratory settings. Otherwise, its scientific value should be questioned. (The CAPM, for instance, was not meant to be applicable solely to the NYSE.) By the same token, one ought to be careful when extrapolating conclusions from experiments to naturally occuring markets. Instead, the experiments are meant to verify whether the empirical rejections on historical data came about because there is something fundamentally wrong with asset pricing theory (e.g., markets do not equilibrate).
The experiments that are discussed in this article have often been tightly designed with a particular theory in mind (e.g., Arrow and Debreu's complete-markets model). One may object that it would not be surprising if such experiments confirm the theory. This is not necessarily true. We already mentioned that the right design can enhance the significance of the results. When testing Arrow and Debreu's model, for instance, it should not be made obvious to the subjects what the aggregate wealth in each of the future states is. In Arrow and Debreu's model, prices for (Arrow-Debreu) securities that pay off in equally likely states are ranked inversely to the aggregate wealth across those states. When the experimentor detects that prices align accordingly, the result is forceful, because only the experimentor could possibly have verified this.
Similarly, equilibration of financial markets is far from a foregone conclusion. This question has preoccupied general equilibrium theorists for a long time, and we know that the answers can easily be negative. See, e.g., [3, 38, 47] .
Recent experiments have demonstrated that markets have to be thick in order to facilitate equilibration in accordance with competitive theory. That is, the number of subjects has to be sufficiently large, often far above the typical numbers of goods markets experiments. At present, we do not know how the number of subjects relates to the number of securities. We do know, however, that thick markets translate into small and stable bid-ask spreads, enabling subjects to rebalance their portfolios at minimum cost. This could be the reason why thick markets experiments have been far more succesful.
A last general remark is necessary before we discuss individual experiments. There is one important dimension in which financial markets experiments differ from the more traditional and better known goods markets experiments. In the latter, equilibrium prices can generally be computed directly, and equilibration be measured in a straightforward way. Because of lack of knowledge of subjects' risk aversion, equilibration in financial markets experiments has to be verified indirectly. Asset pricing theory provides the means, though.
Generally, the theory characterizes equilibrium independent of not only risk aversion, but endowments as well. This provides an opportunity, because, even if we were to know subjects' risk preferences, and, hence, were to compute equilibrium prices, the inevitable off-equilibrium trading leads to changes in endowments which may well invalidate the equilibrium based on initial allocations. Off-equilibrium trading has plagued the interpretation of many goods experiments. Asset pricing theory makes it possible to measure the distance from equilibrium in experimental financial markets without concern for off-equilibrium asset re-allocations.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the design of a typical financial markets experiment. In Section 3, we present the results of experiments aimed at testing theoretical predictions about the pricing of risk. Section 4 elaborates on information aggregation experiments. Section 5 concludes with a list of open questions.
Anatomy Of A Typical (Large-Scale) Experiment
Imagine the following situation. A number of subjects are endowed with a set of securities whose liquidation values depend on the realization of a state, randomly drawn with commonly known probabilities (usually equal likelihood). The subjects are allowed to trade the securities during a certain period before the state is drawn and liquidation values are determined. They are also given some cash, because the securities are to be traded in markets where settlement occurs in terms of currency, to be called francs (F). After liquidation values are determined, subjects are paid based on their final holdings of securities and cash, minus a preset minimum threshold, to be thought of as the payment for the loan of securities.
Let there be three securities, two that are risky ("A" and "B"), and one that is riskfree ("Notes"). Their payoffs are determined by a matrix like the one displayed in Table 1 . Securities A and B cannot be sold short, but the Notes can, up to a certain level (say, 8).
Trade takes place in web-based electronic open-book markets for each security. Subjects submit limit orders, which are either crossed against opposing orders (at the price of the latter), or displayed in a book.
The market setup is very much like the one found in, e.g., the Paris Bourse, or the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange.
Subjects have access to the entire book. Identities are not revealed (each subject is assigned an individual ID number, which is the only identification that ever appears in the public records). Subjects have also access to the entire history of transactions (graphically and numerically). The trading interface is referred to as Marketscape.
The main webpage of Marketscape is reproduced in Figure 1 . For each market, this core webpage displays (i) individual holdings, (ii) best standing bid and ask, (iii) last transaction price, (iv) personal best bid and ask, (iv) access to historical data (individual and public), and (v) an order form. Inspection of the latter reveals that subjects can submit limit orders for multiple units, and can attach a deadline. The core webpage has links to many other webpages, including instructions, help, payout (dividend) history, etc.
Announcements are displayed on the main webpage and logged in an announcements webpage.
At the beginning of each (trading) period, subjects are endowed with a certain number of each security. E.g., 5 of A, 4 of B and no Notes. It is important to understand that these endowments are private information only, so that nobody really knows what the aggregate endowment is. In addition, since the trading is web-based, and, therefore, usually physically decentralized (subjects log in from any place that they find convenient), subjects can only get a rough idea of how many participants there are, by looking at the open book, or the history of transactions.
Nobody is given superior information about the likelihood of the states that are to be drawn at the end of each period. In other words, information is symmetric.
The endowment of cash is typically F400. Subjects cannot submit bids if they have insufficient cash to execute them. So, there is a cash-in-advance constraint that will noticeably affect the interest rate in the experiments. A typical loan repayment is F1900. This amounts to a relatively high level of leverage, 2 meant to amplify risk. The franc earnings are exchanged for U.S. dollars at a pre-announced exchange rate (e.g., $0.02 per franc).
Experiments usually last for 3 or 4 hours, with periods of 25 minutes of trading, and 5 minutes break (to determine payouts, and to refresh the allocations of securities and cash). Subjects take home the cumulative earnings. If a subject has negative cumulative earnings for more than two periods, he or she is barred from further participation. One sometimes gives subjects a signup reward, so that they start out with a positive earnings position.
Finance theory makes precise predictions about the pricing outcomes in this setting. Foremost, it predicts that, each period, markets should equilibrate. Second, in equilibrium, expected returns in excess of the riskfree rate will be proportional to aggregate risk. Translating this prediction into two specific asset pricing models, the CAPM and the Arrow-Debreu complete-markets model (notice that the number of securities with independent payoffs equals the number of states, so that markets are indeed complete), this means:
1. Expected excess returns are proportional to market "beta," or, equivalently, the market portfolio is mean-variance optimal.
The ranking of the state prices should be inverse to the ranking of the aggregate payout across the states.
The CAPM is more restrictive, as it assumes quadratic utility. But its prediction is more specific than that of the Arrow-Debreu model. Hopefully, a quadratic function approximates subjects' risk attitudes well 2 With an initial allocation of 5 of A and 4 of B, and the payoff matrix in Table 1 , the expected payment per period is only F450 (=400+5*230+4*200-1900).
enough for mean-variance analysis to obtain. This may be reasonable, given the size of a typical stake in a financial markets experiment.
One aspect of these predictions deserves emphasis. It is possible to characterize equilibrium without having to know subjects' attitudes toward risk. They only have to be risk averse. No matter what the level of risk aversion is, the distance from equilibrium can be measured by how far the market portfolio is from mean-variance optimality (CAPM) or whether the ranking of state prices is inverse to the ranking of aggregate wealth (Arrow-Debreu model). This is important, as mentioned before, not only because experimentors do not know subjects' risk attitudes, but also because these attitudes may change through inevitable wealth changes in the trading towards, but away from, equilibrium. The prices that support (instantaneous) equilibrium at the original endowments may no longer be valid after a few off-equilibrium trades. Still, the prices that support equilibrium at the new wealth levels must be such that the market portfolio is mean-variance optimal (CAPM) or they must imply state prices that are ranked inversely to aggregate payout (Arrow-Debreu model).
If the above predictions are confirmed in the data, the results are powerful, because subjects themselves do not have the necessary information to verify or exploit them, as pointed out earlier. In particular, subjects
are not told what other subjects' endowments are. Moreover, the decentralized nature of these web-based markets makes it hard to estimate the size (number of subjects) of the market. Hence, subjects do not know the nature of aggregate risk (aggregate payoff across states), or, in CAPM language, the composition of the market portfolio.
Experimental Evidence On The Pricing Of Risk
The first large-scale 3 financial markets experiment was organized on October 7, 1998. It will be referred to as the "Yale1" experiment. Participants were students in the MSIA program at the Yale School of Management, who traded over the internet using the interface of Figure 1 . Thirty subjects took part in this 3 Results from similar, small-scale financial markets experiments are reported in [12] . Because of thin market problems, small-scale markets do not generate results that are as sharp as the ones reported here. Small-scale experiments can also be found in [33] , which reports only tests of linearity in the relationship between expected returns and beta, however, and not full mean-variance optimality of the market portfolio. experiment, and each was given an equal number of each of the risky securities (A and B), but none of the notes. This information was not common knowledge. (In later experiments, the allocations were changed, in order to verify that the CAPM and Arrow-Debreu equilibria come about even with very asymmetric allocations of risky securities.) The remainder of the situation is as described in the previous section. Figure 2 are equilibrium prices. At first, one would doubt this, because there is a trend in the prices.
Notice that the price of the Notes invariably starts below the payout of F100, implying a positive interest rate (its payoff is F100), only to increase to F100 by the end of each period. Because there is no time value to money (cash earns zero interest, and the time horizon is really small), the equilibrium interest rate is zero.
At the end of each period, the pricing of the Notes does reflect a zero interest rate. Earlier on, however, the positive interest rate suggests a binding cash-in-advance constraint: subjects borrow money in order to purchase one type of risky security without having to first procur the necessary cash by selling the other type. Cash-in-advance constraints have been appealed to in macroeconomics to explain the role of money and riskfree bonds (see, e.g., [16, 37] ), but have usually been associated with the purchase of goods, and not with portfolio rebalancing. It is the latter that drives the interest rate in the experiments. Figure 3 plots the distance from CAPM equilibrium for each transaction point. The distance is measured as the difference between the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio (which the experimentors obviously knew, even if subjects did not) and the maximum Sharpe ratio. The Sharpe ratio is the ratio of the mean excess return divided by the volatility. In the CAPM equilibrium, expected excess returns ought to be proportional to covariance with the market portfolio. As mentioned in the previous section, this means that the market portfolio is mean-variance efficient: it offers the highest mean excess return for its volatility. The Sharpe ratio provides a simple measure of a portfolio's mean excess return against it volatity. In the CAPM equilibrium, the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio should be maximal, i.e., it generates maximum mean excess return for a given volatility. Figure 3 verifies that the market moved towards the CAPM equilibrium by plotting the difference between the market Sharpe ratio and the maximal Sharpe ratio. This difference is referred to as ∆ M . For CAPM equilibrium,
The plot in Figure 3 is remarkable. While it does take a substantial amount of time, the market in "Yale1" eventually reaches the CAPM equilibrium. This is solid support in favor of the CAPM. It implies that CAPM is not merely a nice mathematical model, but also that it predicts the eventual pricing of risky securities in experimental financial markets. In other words, it has scientific value.
It should be emphasized that the CAPM obtains despite the fact that subjects did not know what the market portfolio was. One may think that this is not compelling evidence, because, in "Yale1," subjects were given the same initial allocations of risky securities, and, hence, could rightly assume that the composition of the market portfolio was like their own. In the other experiments, however, the initial allocations varied across subjects, and, hence, if subjects really thought that their own portfolio mirrored the market portfolio, they would have been very wrong. hence, the state-price probabilities, will rank inversely to the aggregate payout (in this case, the payout on the market portfolio) across states. (Again, this is an implication of the general prediction that expected excess returns will be proportional to covariance with aggregate risk.) From Table 1 and the fact that an equal number of securities A and B were in the market, it follows that the aggregate payout is highest in state Y, followed by states Z and X. Consequently, the state-price probability for state X should be highest, and that for state Y lowest. Figure 4 shows that the prediction from the Arrow-Debreu model eventually obtains. In fact, already early on, the state-price probability for X tends to increase, and that for Y tends to decrease, whereas that for Z attempts to position itself in the middle.
Again, this is remarkable support for asset pricing theory. Subjects did not know the distribution of the aggregate payout across states, so did not price the Arrow-Debreu claims deliberately in accordance with the theory. In fact, it is doubtful whether subjects cared about state contingent securities at all. These were not directly traded. They could not even have been created artificially as a portfolio of A, B and the Notes, because that would require one to shortsell at least one of the risky securities, which was not allowed. Also, only a minority of subjects were familiar with the notion of a state security, or state-price probabilities.
The picture one forms of "Yale1" was easily replicated in other experiments. See [13] for further details.
This illustrates one important advantage of experimental work over empirical analysis of historical data:
replicability. Overall, the experiments demonstrated the validity of the cornerstone of modern asset pricing theory, namely, that markets tend to price assets such that expected returns are proportional to covariance with aggregate risk.
Of course, it is a leap of faith to deduce from this evidence that the CAPM or Arrow-Debreu equilibrium must somehow be the driving force in markets such as the NYSE or NASDAQ. The experimental financial markets are very simple, and successes emerge only when their scale is sufficiently large. In contrast, the NYSE and NASDAQ are far more complex, the stakes involved much bigger, and trade is very heterogeneous.
But the experiments demonstrate that the basic propositions of modern asset pricing theory are not only a nice example of applied mathematics, but predict the outcomes in simple market environments. This success is the beginning of a long journey which hopefully will lead towards a better understanding of far more complex financial markets such as the NYSE and NASDAQ.
Experiments On Information Aggregation
Much to the surprise of empiricists who have studied historical data from naturally occuring financial markets, experiments have in fact mostly focused on what would seem to be the more difficult of the two branches of asset pricing theory, namely, information aggregation. This may be because of a widely held belief that risk aversion does not play a role at the scale of standard experimental financial markets, and, hence, that the theory of risk allocation cannot be studied experimentally. Because trade may become thin or nonexistent if subjects are indeed risk neutral, experimentors have often resorted to paying different dividends across subjects, thereby giving them a serious reason to trade. Unfortunately, this design does make it hard to interpret the experiments, because asset pricing theory does not allow for differentiation of dividends across investors (nor is it allowed in naturally occuring financial markets such as the NYSE 4 ).
Examples of experiments on information aggregation are [2, 15, 18, 19, 22, 25, 34, 39, 41, 48, 49] . 5 As mentioned before, thinking about information aggregation led to the (fairly loose) Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH; see [23, 24] ), followed by extensions of equilibrium notions aimed at understanding EMH, namely, the fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium (FRREE; [30, 35, 45] ) as well as the partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium (PRREE; [31] ).
Experiments meant to verify information aggregation have generated mixed support. One only infrequently observes FRREE, and the frequency appears to depend on the design specifics. In particular, when the payoff structure is unknown (except one's own), financial markets are generally not capable of fully aggregating the information that is out there.
While the analogy is not watertight, absence of common knowledge of the payoff structure is akin to absence of common knowledge of the aggregate supply of risk. Asset pricing theory does make precise predictions about the impact of absence of common knowledge of aggregate risk on information aggregation.
Problems are known to arise and led to the development of the notion of a partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium, PRREE. See [1, 31] . So, one sensible conjecture is that the right equilibrium that explains the outcomes in these experiments is PRREE, and not FRREE. In other words, experimentors wanted to verify FRREE in their markets, while they should have looked for PRREE. 6 The problem with PRREE is that the precise amount of aggregation of information depends on the level 4 But after-tax dividends generally vary across investors. Still, asset pricing under differential taxation continues to raise ample unresolved issues. See [17, 21] (theory) and [10] (empirics). 5 There is a related class of experiments, namely, those that study the Perfect Foresight Equilibrium (PFE; it can also be considered to be a Fully Revealing Rational Expectations Equilibrium -FRREE, which is what the experimentors have generally called them). These experiments demonstrate that futures markets speed up convergence to PFE, by providing unambiguous signals about future equilibrium prices. Among others, see [26, 27, 28, 29, 32, 43] . The focus is on the mechanics of price discovery, attempting to discover the catalyzers that accelerate equilibration. There isn't a unified theoretical framework that inspires the conjectures behind the experiments, but the regularities that are discovered do indicate that there must be one.
A related study is [25] , where the impact of common knowledge of the market parameters on the speed of convergence to FRREE is gauged experimentally. More recently, [5] have used pre-trade (pre-opening) communication schemes to accelerate equilibration. 6 PRREE was used to evaluate experimental results in [19] , but the risk aversion that is crucial to the theory was not part of the analysis.
and distribution of risk aversion, both of which are hard to control in an experimental setting, or cannot be measured without knowledge of the PRREE that is to be determined. See, e.g., the model in [1] , where equilibrium prices are noisy signals of the aggregate information in the marketplace, and the noise depends not only on the precision of individuals' signals, but also on risk aversion.
Consequently, experimental verification of PRREE seems impossible. One can only test whether prices aggregate any information at all, i.e., reject the null of no information aggregation, which experimentalists have been referring to as Private Information Equilibrium -PIE. Likewise, one can reject the null of full information aggregation (FRREE). Both equilibria are rejected in the experiments. So, the truth of aggregation lies in between no and full aggregation. But that does not imply markets settle at the theoretical PRREE. Markets may as well remain in an unsettled state of partial revelation but no equilibrium.
As mentioned before, however, certain experimental designs did produce unambiguous evidence of full information aggregation when aggregate risk was fully knowable. These include experiments with a single risky security with common payoff for everybody, or with a complete, uniform (same number for each subject/state) set of state contingent claims. Both designs are studied in, e.g., the seminal paper [41] .
Theory predicts that FRREE would obtain, and indeed, these experimental designs do generate the best support of full information aggregation.
In [41] , one design involved a complete set of contingent claims, though with different payoffs depending on the holder. Hence, the aggregate risk could not possibly have been common knowledge at the outset, because the experimentors did not pre-announce all possible payoff structures. Still, one can plausibly assume that the aggregate risk became quickly transparent from the aggressive bids of the subjects who would receive the highest dividend in a given state. This would explain the relative success of the experimental design.
In summary, experiments of information aggregation have produced ample evidence that financial markets do not always fully aggregate information. It can be argued that this confirms asset pricing theory, because aggregate risk was generally unknown, and, hence, theory would predict that information would only be partially revealed in equilibrium prices (PRREE). Unfortunately, we cannot determine precisely whether prices settled at a PRREE, absent control and knowledge of subjects' risk aversion. We only know that prices did aggregate some information. Experimental designs with transparent aggregate risk do produce better evidence in favor of full information aggregation. Again, this confirms asset pricing theory.
Information Mirages
Even in experiments that provide the best support for full information aggregation, failures do occur. That is, information sometimes does not aggregate, or markets become convinced that the wrong state is drawn.
This phenomenon has become known in the literature as "information mirages," and were investigated extensively in [14] .
Asset pricing theory predicts that, if the conditions are right (common knowledge of aggregate risk,
etc.), markets should be capable of aggregating information 100% of time. But this conclusion is based on the implausible assumption that investors know the mapping from states to prices. Because experiments invariably are limited in time, markets may not be able to fully learn this mapping. Because they are in a learning process, mistakes are bound to occur, no matter how rational markets are.
To put this differently: even the best Bayesian learner makes mistakes. But then an interesting question emerges: are the number of mistakes we observe in the laboratory consistent with Bayesian learning?
Methodology has recently been developed to answer this question. This methodology was originally aimed at testing asset pricing theory on historical data. Analysis of such data is rendered extremely difficult because they may display subtle biases, either because the market happened to have mistaken expectations over the history at hand (e.g., investors were too optimistic), or the empiricist is forced to work with a biased sample (investors' optimism was warranted when taking a longer-term view, or based on a larger cross-section of assets). In both cases, the market's prior belief cannot be readily estimated from the frequency distribution of actual outcomes, unlike what has been implicitly assumed in virtually the entire empirical literature on asset pricing. See [8, 9] . The empirical success of the technique was demonstrated in [6, 7, 9, 11] .
The methodology lends itself also to verifying whether mirages in experiments on information aggregation are consistent with the the theoretical tendency of even the most rational learner to make mistakes. In this context, the methodology works as follows. At the beginning of every period, the market starts with a (potentially arbitrary or time-varying) prior over the possible states of nature. As orders come to the market and trades take place, the market updates its beliefs (as reflected in the transaction prices) in a Bayesian way. When implementing Bayes' law, it is assumed that the market reads the information correctly, namely, that it knows the likelihood of the signals (which come out of the "book," i.e., the list of bids and asks, as well as recent trades) given the eventual state. These assumptions lead to rather simple restrictions on the dynamics of securities prices, which can readily be verified on experimental data.
Among other things, one can prove the following:
where R i t denotes the return on security i over the period (t − 1, t), I t−1 is the information that the market had (state of the "book"), and the state (indexed s) equals i. Security i is a state contingent security that pays one dollar when the state is i and zero otherwise. In words, the inverse return on winning state contingent security must be one on average. See [8] .
The restriction in (1) provides the basis for an indirect test of the conjecture that the number of "mirages" (false price developments) corresponds to what one would expect to happen by chance if markets learn in a rational way.
To illustrate this, consider pricing data from a recent (May 25, 1999) pilot thick-market information aggregation experiment ran at Caltech. Like the experiments in [14] , they generally showed support for the notion that financial markets are capable of aggregating even weak signals, and that traders are unable to consistently manipulate the outcome. Still, a certain number of failures occured.
The market technology was the same as the one described in Section 2. Now, however, a complete set of state contingent claims was traded, covering all ten possible states, labeled Q through Z. Every subject received an equal number of each of the state contingent claims, in addition to cash. When a state was drawn, say R, state claim R paid 200 franks. If another state was drawn, claim R paid zero.
Private information ("clues") were given to each of the subjects, in the following form. At the beginning of a period, three letters were randomly drawn (with replacement) from an urn for each subject. The urn contained twelve letters. Three of these letters equaled the actual state that had been selected for that period, while the other nine letters in the urn would corresponded to the nine other states. The subjects were told the recalculated (conditional) probabilities as well, in order to facilitate inference. Of course, they were free to ignore that information.
Notice how limited this private information was. While the prior probability of any state was one out of ten, the updated probability for any state would change little. For instance, if a subject was given the sequence 'RUS', then she would infer that the chances of states R, U and S would have increased to 0.19 only. But over 60 subjects participated in this experiment. Combining 60 three-letter signals provides one with almost certainty of the actual state.
The market prices did not always fully aggregate the available information, as one can infer from Figure 5 , which plots the evolution of the transaction prices of the winning contingent claim (only) in each period.
Under full aggregation, we would expect the prices of the winning contract to rise to its payoff, namely, 200 francs. Figure 5 demonstrates that this is often not the case, even if the price almost invariably increases above its unconditional expected payoff of 20 francs (= 0.10 * 200).
With the restriction in (1), however, one can test whether the dynamics of the transaction prices of winner contracts is consistent with the null that the market read the information (in the book) correctly, as explained above. Table 2 lists, across all periods and for each period separately, (i) the average inverse return on winning contingent claims, (ii) the corresponding z-statistic. Returns were computed from one transaction to the next. That is, time is implicitly measured as transaction time.
Across all periods, the inverse return equals 1.0015. The corresponding z-statistic, at 1.16, indicates that this is not significantly different from one (two-sided test). Hence, we fail to reject the null behind the restriction in Equation (1) . The same conclusion obtains for each period, except period 6, where the z-statistic is -1.65, which is just significant at the 10% level (two-sided test).
For comparison, Table 2 also displays the average of the returns themselves (not the inverse returns) and the corresponding z-statistics. Because only the returns on winning securities are measured, one expects the average to be above one. This is the result of selection bias. Across all periods, the effect is strong: the average return on winning contracts is 1.0047, which, with a z-statistic of 3.5, is significant even at the 0.1% level. The period results are less pronounced, with six averages that are significantly positive only at the 10% level. One can compute, however, the probability of obtaining six or more rejections (at the 10% level) of the null that the average is non-positive: it is less than 0.1%, confirming the overall image.
Hence, the results in Table 2 support the hypothesis that the market read correctly whatever information was revealed through trading activity and entries in the book. The market did make mistakes (it often failed to completely aggregate the available information), but these are to be expected even from a rational Bayesian learner who knows how to interpret signals from the book. That is, the "information mirages" are no indication of irrationality.
There may be a problem with this experiment (and others organized like this one), however. All subjects start out with the same number of each contingent claim, and this is common knowledge. That implies:
there is no aggregate risk, and this is known. Not only does this mean that there will be no risk premium (prices equal expected payoffs, which is assumed behind (1)), but it also means that nobody should trade, because nobody has a risky endowment, even if prices are not fully revealing. This is an awkward situation: subjects are invited to trade, but the experiment is designed such that there would be no trade. Why do subjects trade? Are they confused?
The second column of Table 2 indicates that there was a fair amount of trade. Per period, up to 882 transactions took place in the winning security only. This amounts to more than 10 transactions per subject.
Trading volume does decline later in the experiment, but is still high in the last period.
Disagreement about how to interpret the information in the book may explain the trading activity.
Unfortunately, there is not much theory to support such an explanation. Virtually all asset pricing theory (as well as most of game theory) is based on a common prior assumption, which means that investors essentially hold the same unconditional beliefs and interpret signals alike, even if signals may differ across
investors. An exception is [4] . (In game theory, this common prior assumption is referred to as the Harsanyi doctrine; in dynamic asset pricing theory, an even more extreme position is taken, namely that the prior belief is correct -see [36] .) Absent a well-developed theory of asset pricing with disagreeing investors ("beauty contests"), it is hard to interpret the experimental results in Figure 5 and Table 2 , just like it was not possible to fully understand the failure of information aggregation in older experiments such as those reported in [41] , where payouts depended on the identity of the holder, a situation that has not been thoroughly investigated in asset pricing theory.
To give subjects a reason to trade, one could have allocated a different number of contingent claims to different subjects. That is, a minor change in the experimental design would make the experiment easier to understand from a theoretical point of view.
Conclusion
This article discussed recent experiments involving financial markets in light of asset pricing theory. That is, it studied to what extent these experiments provided support of the basic tenets of modern asset pricing theory. These are: (i) markets equilibrate to the point that only covariance with aggregate risk is priced,
(ii) markets aggregate dispersed information.
The support for the first prediction seems to be solid, at least from large-scale experiments. The significance of this finding cannot be understated, because the evidence comes from experiments were subjects could not possibly have used the theory to deliberately set prices accordingly.
What conclusion can one draw from these experiments with respect to pricing in markets outside the laboratory? As discussed in the article, it would be premature to claim that asset pricing theory explains the workings of complex institutions such as the NYSE or NASDAQ. The experiments are only a first step: they demonstrated that asset pricing theory has scientific value. Far more work will have to be done before the experimental results shed light on workings of the NYSE and NASDAQ. 7 The article argued that there is less evidence on prediction (ii), namely, that financial markets aggregate dispersed information. Experiments that were meant to test aggregation are apparently hard to interpret, because their design often deviated in important respects from the theoretical modeling. Most significantly, payoffs generally depended on the identity of the holder. Or the design led to situations were theory predicted that there would be no trade, yet substantial trading occured.
The article did provide a formal test that the "information mirages" that one observes in succesful aggregation experiments -instances where the market did fail to aggregate the information -are to be explained as the natural mistakes that even the most rational (Bayesian) learner would make. In particular, even if one knows the likelihood of the state of the trading book given each possible final outcome, one would not have been able to do better than the market.
The general conclusion that this article conveys, then, is that experimentation with financial markets should be solidly founded on the theory. If it is, the results are significant, as with the experiments meant 7 The situation is similar in the physical sciences. Being able to prove in the laboratory that gravity attracts objects in a vacuum with a constant accelaration seems to be utterly irrelevant in designing large aircraft. Yet, the finding that the acceleration caused by gravity was indeed constant eventually did lead to enough understanding of physics to build jumbo jets.
to test prediction (i). Otherwise, little can be inferred. Too little is known about the workings of financial markets to design experiments merely with the aim "to see what happens."
The article did not mention one important aspect of asset pricing theory, namely its predictions regarding equilibrium allocations. From a normative point of view, these are important: the first welfare theorem states that complete, competitive markets will generate allocations that cannot be improved upon.
Granted, empirical research on historical data has also focused on pricing implications, avoiding allocational predictions entirely. It is time to study whether financial markets are indeed capable of inducing optimal allocations. If not, one wonders how markets are able to price securities correctly (implication (i) above), yet unable to redistribute securities in a way that everybody is better off. 
